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Abstract  
Using the POLITY IV and Freedom House indices, Rowley and Smith (2009) found that 
countries with Muslim majorities enjoy less freedom and are less democratic than countries in 
which Muslims are a minority. Because the POLITY IV and Freedom House indices have 
been criticized on several grounds, I reinvestigate Rowley and Smith´s finding using the new 
Democracy-Dictatorship data from Cheibub et al. (2010). The empirical results confirm that 
countries with Muslim majorities are indeed less likely to be democratic.    
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Rowley and Smith (2009) found that countries with Muslim majorities enjoy less 
freedom and are less democratic than countries in which Muslims are a minority.
2 The authors 
established their result by employing the POLITY IV and the Freedom House indices as the 
means of measuring democracy. These indices have, however, been criticized on several 
grounds (Cheibub et al. 2010).
3 The new Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) measure of political 
regimes by Cheibub et al. (2010) avoids the problems inherent in the POLITY IV and the 
Freedom House indices. The DD measure basically distinguishes between regimes in which 
executive and legislative offices are allocated via contested elections and those in which they 
are not. In this minimal definition of democracy, the variable takes on the value one for 
democracies and zero otherwise. See Cheibub et al. (2010) for a more encompassing 
discussion on classifying democracies and dictatorships. 
Cheibub et al. (2010) show that the choice of democracy measure matters by 
replicating studies such as Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Epstein 
et al. (2006). Against the background of the criticism on the POLITY and the Freedom House 
indices, I reinvestigate whether countries with Muslim majorities are less democratic 
employing the Democracy-Dictatorship data from Cheibub et al. (2010) and the data on 
religion from Alesina et al. (2003). I confirm that having a Muslim majority is an impediment 
                                                 
2 Studies by Barro (1999), Ross (2001), and Borooah and Paldam (2007) also find that democracy and Islam are 
negatively associated. Gassebner et al. (2009) show that oil producing Muslim countries are less likely to 
become democracies. Facchini (2010) shows that Islam and institutions of freedom are negatively associated. On 
economic performance in Islamic countries, see Kuran (1997) and Hillman (2007a). For an overview of the 
relation between democracy and economic development, see Hillman (2007b). See Maseland and van Hoorn 
(2010) on the attitudes towards democracy in the Muslim world. See Berggren and Bjørnskov (2010) on religion 
and social trust. 
3 See also Munk and Verkuilen (2002), Vreeland (2008). For example, Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 28) arrive at 
the conclusion that Freedom House is an index “which [exemplifies] problems in all areas of conceptualization, 
measurement, and aggregation.” The POLITY IV index has been criticized for similar reasons, but “the 
usefulness of the POLITY IV dataset lies in its components” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 76). The POLITY index has 
five components. In particular, the Chief Executive variable “provides useful information about whether the 
chief executive has unlimited authority, whether there is a legislature with slight or moderate ability to check the 
power of the executive, whether the legislature has substantial ability to check the executive, or whether the 
executive has parity with or is subordinate to the legislature” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 76).  
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to democracy. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the empirical 
results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical strategy 
I specify a probit model of the following form: 
 
Democracyi = α + β Muslim Sharei  +Σj ζ xij +Σk δ Regionik +Σl γ Legal Originil + ui                     
 
with i = 1,...,191; j=1,2; k=1,...,4; l=1,2 
where Democracyi  is the the DD measure by Cheibub et al. (2010) for country i. I employ a 
cross section of 191 countries for the year 2007.
4 Muslim Sharei describes the proportion of 
Muslims in the total population of each country.  I employ the data on religious 
fractionalization by Alesina et al. (2003). This database reports for each country for the period 
1980-1998 the percentage of the population belonging to the three most widespread religions 
in the world. However, the database contains many missing observations. The most complete 
data are available for Islam. In Alesina’s data base the category “Muslim” is for some 
countries subdivided in “Shia Muslim” and “Sunni Muslim”, for other countries this sub-
division is not recorded. I therefore combine the available data to obtain a single variable that 
describes the share of Muslims in the total population of each country. Σj ζ xij describes two 
economic control variables. I include the logarithm (log) of real GDP per capita (referring to 
the year 2007) and an oil exporter dummy variable that takes on the value one if exports of oil 
exceed 50% of total exports (Easterly and Sewadeh 2001). Σk δ Regionik is a set of regional 
dummy variables that take on the value of one when a country belongs to a particular region 
and zero otherwise. I distinguish five different regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, America and 
                                                 
4 I choose the year 2007 as most recent year because of availability of data for GDP as control variable. The 191 
countries included are the countries represented in the United Nations General Assembly, except Monaco, for 
which the Democracy-Dictatorship variable is not available.  
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Oceania. To avoid multicollinearity between the regional dummies, one of them denotes the 
reference category (here Africa). The estimated effects of the other regional dummies are 
deviations from the reference category. Σl γ Legal Originil is a set of legal origin dummy 
variables (La Porta et al. 1999). I distinguish between three different legal origins: French, 
British and Socialist (all countries with German and Scandinavian legal origin are 
democracies so that I cannot include variables describing German and Scandinavian legal 
origin). The reference category is French. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all variables 
included. I estimate a probit model with robust standard errors.  
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Basic results 
Table 2 shows the regression results of the coefficient estimates. The dependent 
variable is coded such that democracies take on the value one and dictatorships take on the 
value zero. Positive coefficients of the explanatory variables thus mean that the explanatory 
variable induces a positive influence on democracy and vice versa. Column (1) shows results 
without control variables. In column (2), I have included log GDP per capita and the oil 
exporter dummy variable as basic economic control variables, which somewhat reduces the 
sample size because of the absence of observations on GDP. Column (3) presents the results 
when all control variables are included. Log GDP per capita has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in column (2), but does not turn out to be statistically 
significant in column (3). In a similar vein, the oil exporter dummy variable has the expected 
negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in column (2), but does not turn 
out to be statistically significant in column (3). The regional variables “America” and 
“Europe” are statistically significant at the 1% level and the regional variable “Oceania” is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The variable “Asia” does not turn out to be 
statistically significant. As expected, the regional dummy variables indicate that democracy  
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has been more pronounced in America, Europe and Oceania than in Africa (reference 
category). The Socialist legal origin variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
indicates that democracy was less pronounced in countries with a socialist legal origin 
compared to countries with a French legal origin. The British legal origin variable does not 
turn out to be statistically significant. 
The results in Table 2 show that the share of Muslims in a society has a negative 
influence on democracy: the coefficient of the Muslim share variable has a negative sign and 
is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (2) and at the 5% level in column 
(3). Based on the coefficient estimates, we can calculate the marginal effects of the 
independent variables on the probability of being a democracy. Table 3 shows the change in 
probability of being a democracy when the Muslim share variable changes. The results in 
Table 3 indicate that when the Muslim population share increases by one percentage point, the 
probability of being a democracy decreases by about 0.4%. In other words, a country with no 
Muslims is by about 40% more likely to be democratic than an otherwise identical but purely 
Muslim country. The marginal effects for the full model (column 3 of Table 3) are somewhat 
smaller but remain statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal effects clearly show 
that the probability of being a democracy decreases when the share of Muslims increases. 
 
3.2 Robustness Tests 
I checked the robustness of the results in several ways. Democracies can be coded 
more expansively. Cheibub et al. (2010) have conservatively coded countries as democratic 
only if there has been alternation in power. Some countries appear, however, to have 
"contested" elections for the executive and legislature, but there has never been an alternation 
of the government in power (e.g., Botswana). The data by Cheibub et al. (2010) also allow 
considering these cases as democracies in addition to their conservative coding. I use the more 
expansive democracy variable (type 2) as dependent variable (also referring to the year 2007).  
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The results in Table 4 show that the Muslim share variable retains a negative sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (3). The oil exporter dummy variable 
has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (2) and (3). Log 
GDP per capita, the regional dummy variables and the legal origin variables do not turn out to 
be statistically significant, however. The marginal effects in Table 5 show that when the 
Muslim population share increases by one percentage point the probability of being a 
democracy decreases by about 0.2% or 0.3%. 
The reported effects could be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in 
individual countries. For this reason, I tested whether the results are sensitive to the 
inclusion/exclusion of particular countries. Inferences do not change when excluding an 
individual country. 
The results could suffer from omitted variable bias. The association between 
democracy and the Muslim share is, however, so pronounced that potential omitted variable 




By employing the new Democracy-Dictatorship variables by Cheibub et al. (2010), I 
have reinvestigated how the presence of Islam affects democracy. The findings confirm the 
conclusion of Rowley and Smith (2009) that the greater the share of Muslims in a population, 
the smaller the likelihood that a country will have democratic institutions.    
A large Muslim population share, apart from having a direct negative influence on 
human development and economic performance thus also gives rise to a reinforcing indirect 
effect working through the political institutions.
6 Democratic institutions provide political and 
                                                 
5 See Gassebner et al. (2009) on extreme bounds of democracy. 
6 Muslim majority has been shown to impede human development directly by, e.g., institutionalizing gender 
inequality in education (Norton and Tomal 2009, Cooray and Potrafke 2010).  
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economic freedom, which are foundations for economic development.
7 By compromising 
these democratic institutions, countries with Muslim majorities tend to have relatively low 
living standards. To be sure, Muslim societies may willingly choose their non-democratic 
institutions and the corresponding living standards. However, the non-Muslim population 
living in democracies may confront the end of democracy and also the end of accompanying 
high incomes if there is sufficient demographic change.                                       
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Table A1. Country list: Democracy and Muslim Share. 
Country  Democracy Muslim  Country  Democracy Muslim 
Afghanistan 0  99 Djibouti  0  97.78
Albania 1  69.91 Dominica  1  0
Algeria 0  99.54 Dominican  Republic  1  0
Andorra  1 0 Ecuador  1 0
Angola 0  0 Egypt  0  89
Antigua and Barbuda  1  0 El Salvador  1  0
Argentina 1  1.49 Equatorial  Guinea  0  0
Armenia 1  0 Eritrea  0  69.32
Australia  1 0 Estonia  1 0
Austria 1  0 Ethiopia  0  32.94
Azerbaijan 0  93.41 Fiji  0  7.81
Bahamas  1 0 Finland  1 0
Bahrain 0  81.16 France  1  5.51
Bangladesh 0  88.30 Gabon  0  0
Barbados 1  0 Gambia  0  94.89
Belarus 0  0 Georgia 1  10.96
Belgium 1  0 Germany  1  2.13
Belize 1  0 Ghana 1  14.39
Benin 1  12.03 Greece  1  1.33
Bhutan  1 0 Grenada  1 0
Bolivia  1 0 Guatemala  1 0
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0  42.97 Guinea  0  85.01
Botswana 0  0 Guinea-Bissau  1  45.74
Brazil 1  0 Guyana  0  8.96
Brunei Darussalam  0  67.26 Haiti  0  0
Bulgaria 1  13.1 Honduras  1  0
Burkina Faso  0  50 Hungary  1  0
Burundi  1 0 Iceland  1 0
Cambodia 0  2.18 India  1  11.97
Cameroon  0 21.78 Indonesia  1 87.21
Canada 1  0.94 Iran  0  99.57
Cape Verde  1  0 Iraq  0  97.03
Central African Republic  0  15.1 Ireland  1  0
Chad  0 53.86 Israel  1 14.89
Chile 1  0 Italy  1  1.21
China 0  1.43 Jamaica  1  0
Colombia  1 0 Japan  1 0
Comoros  1 99.31 Jordan  0 96.59
Congo 0  1.77 Kazakhstan  0  47.02
Costa  Rica  1 0 Kenya  1 6
Cote d'Ivoire  0  38.67 Kiribati  1  0
Croatia 1  1.17 Kuwait 0  75.25
Cuba 0  0 Kyrgyzstan  1  70
Cyprus 1  22.09
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic 0  0
Czech  Republic  1 0 Latvia  1 0
Democratic People's 
Republic of K  0  0 Lebanon  0  55.31
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 0  1.4 Lesotho  0  0
Denmark 1  0 Liberia  1  13.92
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Table A1. Country list: Democracy and Muslim Share (continued). 
Country  Democracy Muslim  Country  Democracy Muslim 
Libya 0  97.06
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 1  0
Liechtenstein  1 0 Samoa  0 0
Lithuania  1 0 San  Marino  1 0
Luxembourg  1  0 Sao Tome and Principe  1  0
Macedonia 1  29.9 Saudi  Arabia  0  96.68
Madagascar 1  8.69 Senegal  1  91.99
Malawi 1  20.02 Serbia  1  0
Malaysia 0  52.88 Seychelles  0  0
Maldives 0  100 Sierra  Leone  1  60.04
Mali  1 89.99 Singapore  0 14.92
Malta  1 0 Slovakia  1 0
Marshall  Islands  1 0 Slovenia  1 0
Mauritania 1  99.25 Solomon  Islands  1  0
Mauritius 1  16.1 Somalia  0  99.86
Mexico 1  0 South  Africa  0  0.45
Micronesia 1  0 Spain  1  1.15
Mongolia  1 4.17 Sri  Lanka  1 7.53
Montenegro 0  0 Sudan  0  73
Morocco  0 99.83 Suriname  1 19.72
Mozambique 0  28.22 Swaziland  0  0
Myanmar 0  3.83 Sweden  1  0
Namibia  0 0 Switzerland  1 0
Nauru 1  0 Syria  0  86.02
Nepal 0  3.77 Tajikistan  0  85.10
Netherlands  1 4.34 Thailand  0 4.04
New Zealand  1  0 Timor-Leste  1  30.68
Nicaragua 1  0 Togo  0  14.97
Niger 1  88.69 Tonga  0  0
Nigeria  1  42.98 Trinidad and Tobago  1  5.80
Norway 1  0 Tunisia  0  99.48
Oman  0 14.05 Turkey  1 99.76
Pakistan  0 94.92 Turkrnenistan  0 86.91
Palau  1 0 Tuvalu  1 0
Panama 1  0 Uganda 0  10.55
Papua  New  Guinea  1 0 Ukraine  1 0
Paraguay 1  0 United  Arab  Emirates  0  96.02
Peru 1  0 United  Kingdom  1  1.41
Philippines 1  4.57
United Republic of 
Tanzania 0  37
Poland 1  0 United  States  1  1.35
Portugal  1 0 Uruguay  1 0
Qatar  0 95 Uzbekistan  0 88
Republic of Korea  1  0 Vanuatu  1  0
Republic of Moldova  1  0 Venezuela  1  0
Romania  1 0 Vietnam  0 0
Russian Federation  0  10 Yemen  0  99.89
Rwanda 0  0.97 Zambia  0  0
Saint Kitts and Nevis  1  0 Zimbabwe  0  0




Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Source 
Democracy-Dictatorship  191 0.60  0.49  0  1  Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Democracy-Dictatorship 
(type 2 coding)  191 0.81  0.39  0  1  Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Muslim  192 23.65  36.15  0 100  Alesina et al. (2003) 
GDP per capita (real)  177  13636.65  15679.55  408.71  104707.50 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston 
(1991) 
Oil Exporter  192  0.08  0.26  0  1  Easterly and Sawedeh 
(2001) 
Africa  192 0.28  0.45  0  1  Own Calculation 
Asia  192 0.24  0.43  0  1  Own Calculation 
America  192 0.18  0.39  0  1  Own Calculation 
Oceania  192 0.07  0.26  0  1  Own Calculation 
Europe  192 0.22  0.42  0  1  Own Calculation 
Legal Origin (British)  185  0.34  0.47  0  1  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Legal Origin (German)  185  0.03  0.16  0  1  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Legal Origin (French)  185  0.43  0.50  0  1  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Legal Origin (Scandinavian)  185  0.03  0.16  0  1  La Porta et al. (1999) 




Table 2. Regression Results. 
Probit, robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable: Democracy-Dictatorship Dummy. 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
Muslim -0.0163***  -0.0132***  -0.0087** 
 [5.63]  [4.23]  [2.48] 
log GDP per capita    0.2304**  -0.0504 
   [2.49]  [0.39] 
Oil Exporter    -0.9802**  -0.672 
   [2.17]  [1.41] 
Asia     0.3789 
     [1.13] 
America     1.5760*** 
     [3.59] 
Oceania     0.8350* 
     [1.71] 
Europe     2.1248*** 
     [4.07] 
Legal origin (British)      -0.2467 
     [0.93] 
Legal origin (Socialist)      -0.9187** 
     [2.21] 
Constant 0.6389***  -1.4035*  0.4615 
 [5.53]  [1.66]  [0.44] 
Observations 191  177  176 
Pseudo R-squared  0.14  0.18  0.32 





Table 3. Marginal Effects. Muslim on Democracy. 
(1) (2)  (3) 
-0.005*** -0.004***  -0.002*** 
[7.87] [5.05]  [2.60] 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 4. Regression Results. 
Probit, robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable: Democracy-Dictatorship Dummy (expansive) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
Muslim -0.0137***  -0.0128***  -0.0100*** 
 [4.91]  [3.94]  [2.66] 
log GDP per capita    -0.0341  -0.0717 
   [0.34]  [0.53] 
Oil Exporter    -1.3275***  -1.3628*** 
   [3.33]  [3.00] 
Asia     -0.5332 
     [1.39] 
America     0.75 
     [1.34] 
Oceania     0.1645 
     [0.26] 
Europe     0.5164 
     [0.88] 
Legal origin (British)      -0.4731 
     [1.60] 
Legal origin (Socialist)      -0.6034 
     [1.36] 
Constant 1.3100***  1.7376*  2.2858** 
 [8.86]  [1.84]  [2.06] 
Observations 191  177  176 
Pseudo R-squared  0.14  0.21  0.30 




Table 5. Marginal Effects. Muslim on Democracy (expansive). 
(1) (2)  (3) 
-0.003*** -0.003***  -0.002*** 
[5.84] [4.42]  [2.68] 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 